

# Cherry Picking at the 2015 Swiss Federal Elections: The Influence of Electoral Campaigning on Panachage and Cumulation

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## Abstract

Our contribution analyses the influence of electoral campaigning on candidates' success at the 2015 Swiss elections to the National Council. Concretely, we ask whether and to what extent the intensity and content of a candidate's campaign exerts a persuasive effect on voters. In doing so, we make use of a rather unique setting embedded in the open-list PR-system of Switzerland, namely allowing voters not only to duplicate candidates from a chosen list (cumulation) but also to add candidates from other parties and lists to their selected list (panachage). Using the amount of votes a candidate received from voters favoring other parties or lists gives us an idea about a candidate's persuasive potential to gain votes outside his classical voter segment. We assess a candidate's campaign based on a collection of almost 4,000 political advertisements gathered in 50 important supraregional and regional newspapers covering all 26 cantons, i.e. electoral districts. The influence of the electoral campaign is examined using hierarchical models, by modelling a candidate's electoral success for each ballot list in his district. This procedure bears the advantage that we are in a better position to model the votes of an individual candidate in relation to the alternatives a voter was offered on other party lists. We find that the form as well as the intensity of electoral campaigning matter for electoral success in terms of both, votes gained from cumulation as well as votes gained from panachage. In contrast to findings from other open-list PR-systems, we find that challengers profit substantially more from electoral campaigning than incumbents do.

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<sup>1</sup> The order of authors has been determined by throwing the dice.

## Introduction

The principle of selecting representatives by citizens via popular elections lies at the very heart of representative democracies. In most of the cases, the choice of the candidates is determined by the party a voter decides to support. Yet in some – and mostly European – democracies, citizens also have the possibility to vote for candidates of their choice, within or even across party lists. As a consequence, candidate-specific factors become more important for electoral success in multimember districts that allow for the so called “preferential voting” compared to districts that do not (e.g., Sartori 1976; Katz 1986; Carey and Shugart 1995; Karvonen 2004; Shugart et al. 2005).

Since voters demand more information on a candidate when they are allowed to choose from a larger set of candidates, researchers started to examine the effect of candidate specific factors such as local ties and lower-level political experience (e.g., Shugart et al. 2005; Tavits 2010; Put and Maddens 2015), incumbency (e.g., Moon 2006; Maddens and Put 2013), a candidate’s position on the list (e.g., Lutz 2010; Wauters et al. 2010), his media presence (van Aelst et al. 2008; Elmelund and Hopmann 2012) and the electoral campaign (e.g., Bowler et al. 1996; Maddens et al. 2006; Maddens and Put 2013; Spierings and Jacobs 2014) on electoral outcomes in preferential vote systems.

While most of these factors are predefined by a candidates curriculum vitae, a candidate still has the possibility to promote himself and his capabilities via electoral campaigning – something which is often made use of in systems knowing preferential voting (Katz 1986: 101; Karvonen 2004). Up to now, however, evidence about whether “efforts to cultivate personal vote pay off” (Tavits 2010: 216) is inconclusive (see, e.g., Bowler et al. 1996; Maddens et al. 2006; Elmelund and Hopmann 2012; Spierings and Jacobs 2014). Furthermore, the impact of campaign activities is likely to vary across countries (Spierings and Jacobs 2014: 217-18), which calls for more research in different contexts.

This paper analyses the impact of campaign activities on preferential voting in Switzerland in the framework of the 2015 general elections to the National Council. We focus on Switzerland for two particular reasons. First, we make use of a unique dataset consisting of campaign advertisements published in more than 50 important national and regional newspapers (Bühlmann et al. 2015). With the help of this data, we are not only in a position to examine the impact of the intensity of personal campaigns, but also the effect of their form and content. Second, the electoral system in Switzerland is characterized by strong preferential voting (Karvonen 2004: 208). In most of the countries that hold a certain form of preferential voting,

only candidates from the *same* party (or list) can be chosen.<sup>2</sup> Thus the party choice has a very predominant role, implying that voters look at candidates' attributes only *after* having chosen a preferred party or list. This is different in Switzerland: Swiss voters can 1) cumulate a candidate, i.e. put him twice on a list (mostly implying that another candidate needs to be deleted from the list), and 2) and most relevant for the aim of our investigation – include candidates from *another* party or list onto the chosen list (so called *panachage* and again implying the exclusion of a candidate from a chosen list). This together with the fact that, after determining the amount of seats a party receives, the distribution of seats is dictated by the sum of individual candidates' votes, is likely to present strong incentives for personal vote-seeking behaviour (Selb and Lutz 2015; see also Shugart et al. 2005). Moreover, this particularity allows us to examine potential and unexplored differences in the impact of campaigning between “loyal” preferential votes, i.e. the *cumulation* of a candidate from a chosen list, and “alien” preferential votes, i.e. the *panachage* of candidates from other than the chosen list.

The subsequent sections of the paper are organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss expectations for the impact of electoral campaigns on personal votes. Subsequently, we describe the data as well as the method (section 3) we used in our analyses, which is what we present in section 4, before we discuss the implications of our findings and conclude.

### **Campaign effects**

Broadly speaking, there are two systems for parliamentary elections: the *majority and plurality* versus the *proportional electoral system*. The main aim of the first type is the selection of the most qualified candidate in single-member districts. This winner-take-all-method leads to the emergence of two-party systems; with strong incentives for voters to choose among candidates of two strong parties that hold adequate chances to gain a seat (Duverger 1959). In this situation, a pluralistic society is only badly represented. Adequate representation of such societal plurality is the basic aim of the *proportional representation system* where voters have to choose between several parties representing different ideas. In this system it is the parties that nominate candidates on their lists and candidate voting is less pronounced than in majority and plurality systems.

Yet the candidates that the parties put on the top of their lists may differ from voters' preferences (Katz 1997; Farrell 2011). While in most countries with proportional representation

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<sup>2</sup> Leaning on Karvonen (2004) we can differentiate two types of list proportional representation systems: in systems where you can only choose the preferred party and put their list into the ballot box (closed list), candidate-centered voting is of low importance. However, there are also systems allowing voters to influence which candidates will represent them (open or free list). Different rules allow for a ranking of the candidates on the list (e.g. Ireland), for giving so called preference votes for specific candidates on a list (e.g. Belgium) or allowing for freely choosing several candidates from a party list (e.g. Finland).

system, voters are simply allowed to choose their preferred party and put their list into the ballot box (closed list systems), in some countries there are rules giving the voters some influence on the choice of the candidates. Such open list electoral systems try to combine the advantages of majoritarian and representational systems allowing for party as well as candidate choice, i.e. an ideological as well as a personal representation.

In their path breaking work, Carey and Shugart (1995) argued that in such an open list electoral system, candidates have strong incentives to orient their campaign towards their own reputation. If voters have the possibility to decide on candidates, they ask for information about the candidates. Thus, “candidates may attract support for who they are, or what they have done, or what they might do, rather than simply because of the party to which they belong” (Marsh 2007: 501). Several studies showed that candidate-centred factors are indeed important compared to mere party-centred factors (Karvonen 2004; Marsh 2007; Moser & Scheiner 2005; Shugart et al. 2005; Swindle 2002).

The follow-up question is: which candidate specific factors have an influence on electoral outcomes? Research on this question highlights the impact of local ties and lower-level political experience (e.g., Shugart et al. 2005; Tavits 2010; Put and Maddens 2015), incumbency (e.g., Moon 2006; Maddens and Put 2013), a candidate’s position on the list (e.g., Lutz 2010; Wauters et al. 2010) or his media presence (van Aelst et al. 2008; Elmelund and Hopmann 2012) on electoral success (for a discussion on the assumed effects of these factors see below).

Besides having an interesting curriculum, a candidate can also promote himself by campaigning. Campaign spending is an important way to enhance a candidate’s visibility vis à vis the electorate. Several studies found a positive impact of campaign spending on electoral outcome (e.g., Maddens et al. 2006; Maddens and Put 2013; Spierings and Jacobs 2014; however, see Bowler et al. 1996; Elmelund-Praestekaer and Hopmann 2012 for counter-evidence).

Furthermore, this effect might be stronger for challengers, since voters are less or not at all familiar with new candidates than they are with incumbents. Thus, in the latter case, the “marginal return of campaign expenses should be lower than for challengers, who have to gain visibility during the campaign and can only do so through spending” (Maddens & Put 2013: 853). This relationship has repeatedly been demonstrated in the U.S. (e.g., Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson 1978; Moon 2006). On the other hand, Maddens et al. (2006) could not detect such an effect in Belgium with its proportional electoral system and semi-open list. Maddens and Put (2013: 853) hypothesize that in proportional list systems with large constituencies – the average Belgium constituency counts 13.6 seats – the incumbent MPs are not as well-known as the ones in smaller constituencies or in majoritarian systems with single-member districts. Since in large constituencies, it is more difficult for voters to recall all their incumbents, the campaign

effect between incumbent and challengers is likely to diminish in larger constituencies. On average, the 26 Swiss constituencies are, with 7.7 seats per constituency, of smaller size than the Belgium ones.<sup>3</sup>

However, in our contribution we do not solely focus on the amount of campaign expenses. We rely on a unique dataset consisting of campaign advertisements published in more than 50 important national and regional newspapers (Bühlmann et al. 2015). With the help of this data, we aim at testing the effect of the visibility, the uniqueness and the local anchoring of a candidate's campaign on his electoral outcome. In Switzerland, candidates are not obliged to disclose their funding, which is why we have to rely on other measures of campaigning. Although we agree that other campaigning strategies such as advertising in social media gain in importance, people still pay much more attention to political advertisements in print media than to web pages concerning the elections (Selects 2011).<sup>4</sup> In the following, we argue that it is not only the campaign expenses, i.e. a mere exposure effect that matter but also the strategy as well as the content of a candidate's campaign. To attract (alien) voters, a candidate must be visible, he must show that he is different from other candidates and he must prove connectedness with his constituents.

*Visibility increases eligibility:* Candidates that are more present during the campaign have a comparative advantage over candidates that do not present themselves – independent of the content of their campaign. First, they increase their visibility among the voters and second, they might profit from a mere repeated exposure effect, i.e. from the mechanism that repeated exposure to a stimulus increases its accessibility to the individual's perception (Zajonc 1968: 1). Such an effect is particularly prone when individual voters pursue a low-cost information strategy and rely on cues presented to them (e.g., Moons et al. 2009, see also Steenbergen 2010). Furthermore, visibility can be increased by clever 'product placement' (e.g., Geise & Brettschneider 2010). A coloured advertisement on the front page of a newspaper for example is supposed to attract more attention than a black-white designed advertisement on the advertorial page in the last part of the newspaper.

In order to capture a mere exposure effect, we take the frequency of ads published per candidate. Furthermore, we include variables that capture the visibility of a candidate's campaign. These are the proportion of a candidate's ads published on the first page of a bundled newspaper and the proportion of ads printed in colour.

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<sup>3</sup> Yet the range in the Swiss constituencies is quite substantial: six out of 26 cantons have more than 10 seats, two of them more than 20 (Bern 25; Zurich 35).

<sup>4</sup> In Switzerland, electoral campaigning on television and radio is not allowed.

*Individualized campaigning helps to stand out:* A candidate aiming at attracting voters that do not intend to vote for his party should show some degree of independence. Of course there is a fine line between attracting alien voters and scaring off the own followers. However, since party cohesion is assumed to be smaller in preferential voting systems (Karvonen 2004 ; Katz 1986), showing a certain amount of autonomy can help to win elections. A candidate can demonstrate such autonomy by conducting a highly personalized campaign, i.e. a campaign where the goal is to promote the candidate instead of the party he or she is running for (see e.g., Zittel & Gschwend 2008; Selb & Lutz 2015). In Switzerland, candidates are often supported by important associations. We argue that the degree to which a candidate's campaign was externally funded – we use the percentage of a candidate's ads where this is the case – accounts for the degree of independence from his party. A candidate funded by an association can present himself in a different light and at the same time distance himself from other candidates on his own list. As an additional measure, we include the proportion of ads where the candidate was campaigning without his combatants, assuming that advertising together with several candidates from the same party promotes higher party unity – at the expense of single candidates. Additionally, by showing his connection with an important association, a candidate also gains in uniqueness.

*Demonstrating local rootedness pays off:* Several studies demonstrate the importance of candidates' local-level political characteristics for electoral success (Tavits 2010). Local ties are seen as “a crucial personal vote-earning attribute” (Put and Maddens 2015: 608). Occupying a local office (Tavits 2010) or living in big municipalities (Put and Maddens 2015) can increase the number of votes a candidate gets. Local birthplace and local-level political experience are signals for familiarity with local interests. Therefore, voters seem to reward candidates with local roots. However, we argue that a candidate should actively demonstrate the strength of his local ties during his campaign to convince even more voters than only those already knowing him. To capture whether a candidate's campaign is locally rooted, we introduced the proportion of ads containing one or more testimonials where local celebrities promote the candidate. Furthermore, we use the proportion of ads calling attention to events where voters were able to meet the candidate. We assume that real contact with voters has a high potential to increase a candidate's electoral success (Karvonen 2004).

Of course, looking at the content rather than the extent of campaigning should also include *negative campaigning*. Negative advertising seems to grow in importance (Geer 2006). Providing voters with information about poor characteristics of an alien candidate can be an instrument to alienate voters from the candidate suffering from negative campaigning (Fridkin and Kenney 2011). Yet negative campaigning can also provoke a backlash for the candidate or the party that sponsored the negative promotion (Brooks and Murov 2012; Lau et al. 2007): adherents of the negatively advertised candidate get motivated to support him even more. In order to examine

the potential effect of *negative campaigning*, we include a binary variable capturing whether the candidate has been a victim of negative campaigning in at least one ad published in the forefront of the general elections.

## **Data and Method**

### *The 2015 general elections to the National Council in Switzerland*

Switzerland has a bicameral legislature and popular elections taking place every four years, with the 26 Swiss (half-)cantons forming the districts. While in the Council of States, each full canton gets two seats and each of the former six half-cantons receives one, the electoral rule applying is – with two exceptions – majoritarian. Things are different in the National Council, where the 200 seats are distributed according to a canton's population size using a proportional list formula (D'Hondt). According to the OSCE (2012: 7), the Swiss electoral system is “unusually complex, [but] it has the positive effect of enhancing voters' choice”. Its free list system gives each voter as many votes as there are seats in his or her district (between 1 and 35). A citizen can erase names on preprinted lists, vote for members of different parties or lists (*panachage*), give two votes to a single candidate (*cumulation*) — and can do all of this at the same time. Voting for alien candidates (*panachage*) is quite popular: in the 2015 Swiss elections, 5'756'035 votes (from a total of 39'563'016 votes) stemmed from panachage. Already at the national elections in 1975, Niemetz (1977: 299) detected a certain “panachage enthusiasm” (*Panaschierfreudigkeit*), which he traced back to a stronger personalization of the votes rather than the loosening of party ties.

Thus, the Swiss system combines quite uniquely the advantage of majoritarian electoral systems aiming at selection of the most qualified candidate with the advantage of proportional representation aiming at plural representation. This gives us the opportunity to test the impact of candidates' campaign activities on both, intra-party (i.e. intra-list cumulation) as well as inter-party competition (i.e. inter-list panachage). In this paper, we undertake an exploratory approach and analyse campaign effects on both, “loyal” and “alien” preference votes. For instance, one could assume that individualized campaigns increase the votes a candidate receives from alien lists but not necessarily the votes that she receives from voters who chose her own party list.

For our purpose, we focus on the 20 cantons that dispose of more than one seat in the National Council, since the act of *cumulation* as well as *panachage* requires the possibility to vote for at least two candidates. In the selected cantons, a total of 3788 candidates were running on 422 lists. 1001 out of these candidates (on 220 lists) placed at least one campaign ad in one or more newspapers included in our sample between January 1<sup>st</sup> and the election day on October 18<sup>th</sup>.

### *Method*

In order to examine the effect of campaign activity on personal votes a candidate receives, we ran multilevel models with random intercepts. Unlike other studies which used the Swiss panachage statistics (BFS 2016) at an aggregate level (Lutz 2010), i.e. used the candidates' total number of preference votes cast, we fully exploit the data's potential by modelling a candidate's electoral success for each ballot list in his district. This procedure bears the advantage that we are in a better position to model the votes of an individual candidate *in relation to the alternatives* a voter was offered on other party lists. Hence, as a dependent variable, we employ, on the one hand, the degree to which a candidate was able to exploit the *panachage potential* of a specific list:

$$Y_{ijd} = \log \left( \frac{p_{ij}}{2b_d} \right), \quad (1a)$$

where  $p_{ij}$  is the number of panachage votes obtained by candidate  $i$  on list  $j$  and  $b_d$  the number of valid ballot papers for a list  $d \neq j$ . Since the panachage potential is heavily skewed towards the right, we take the log of it.

On the other hand, we use the degree to which a candidate was able to realise his *cumulation potential* as a dependent variable, which corresponds to the above excluded special case of  $d = j$ :

$$Y_{ij} = \log \left( \frac{p_{ij}}{2b_j} \right) \quad (2a)$$

Our focus on the list-specific achievement allows us to control for some crucial characteristics of the origin of a preferential vote, i.e. a specific voter segment, and thus to model the vote decision more accurately. To do so, we need to account for the fact that each list <sub>$j$</sub> -to-list <sub>$d$</sub> -combination in (1a) itself is nested in a cross-classification of the corresponding party-to-party-combination ( $p_j p_d$ ) and the electoral district (canton ( $c$ )). Hence, equation (1a) must be rewritten as:

$$\left( Y_{ijd} = \log \left( \frac{p_{ij}}{2b_d} \right) \right)_{(p_j p_d c)} \quad (1b)$$

Almost the same applies to the special case (2a):

$$\left( Y_{ij} = \log \left( \frac{p_{ij}}{2b_j} \right) \right)_{(p_j c)} \quad (2b)$$



Since we assume that unobserved features from all these levels affect a candidate's ability to exploit his personal vote potential, our empirical models include separate standard error components.

**Table 1: Standard error components included in the regressions of (1b) and (2b).**

	Panachage models	Cumulation models
Cantons	$u_c$	$u_c$
Parties	$u_{p pa}$	$u_p$
Lists	$u_{jd(p pac)}$	$u_{j(p c)}$
Candidates	$u_{ij(p pac)}$	
Residual	$e_{ijd(p pac)}$	$e_{ij(p c)}$

Taken together, this leads us to a cross-classified random effects model (Snijders/Bosker 1999) whose coefficients are estimated via restricted maximum likelihood (REML).

Beside the variables of the assumed campaign effects as discussed above, we include several additional variables. At the *cantonal level*, we control for the amount of lists presented to the voter, assuming that a higher amount of lists increases the chances for a voter to find a list that matches his preferences, which thus lowers the amount of personal votes. Furthermore, we control for the number of seats, or mandates, per canton (or, district). Furthermore, we include two variables that capture whether a canton has, compared to the previous election and due to its demographic development, one seat more or less to occupy. Although these variables are not supposed to be directly related to the dependent variable, they might strongly influence the degree of competition and thus the level of electoral campaigning within a canton. We thus include these factors in order to account for a potential omitted variable bias (see below).

At the *level of parties* (or, *party-combinations* in the case of panachage), we account for the overall vote share in the previous elections (2011) of the party the candidate belongs to, and – in the case of the panachage models – also for the 2011 vote share of the party receiving a (panachage) vote (= recipient). In case of the panachage models where candidates receive votes from outside their own list, we also include the overall vote share of the party whose list is used (donor) in order to add an “alien” candidate (which goes hand in hand with the donor party losing a vote). Furthermore, we add a binary variable that accounts for the fact whether the donor and the recipient list belong to the same party or not.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> In Switzerland, parties are allowed to run on several lists and sublists (i.e. lists with female candidates and male candidates only, lists with young candidates, etc.).

At the *level of lists* (or, *list-combinations* in the case of panachage), we control whether a candidate receiving a vote (=recipient) is presented on the main or the junior list of a party (compared to other lists of a party, such as Swiss abroad, grey panthers, etc.) as well as the number of mandates won by the party in 2011 in order to monitor the strength of the recipient list in a given canton. In case of the panachage models, we include exactly the same variables for the donor party, i.e. the party whose list was chosen and where an external candidate was added to. Here, we assume that candidates from powerful lists are likely to be enlisted on other, less powerful lists. In addition, we control for the order of the recipient's list (assuming that front lists receive more attention) and whether the chosen list (donor) disposes of free spots, which enhances the potential for cumulation or panachage since no candidate needs to be replaced. Furthermore, we control for the fact that parties are allowed to ally with other parties in "combined lists" (*apparentments*) and also to create "sub-lists," e.g. for young or female candidates only. Here, we assume that voters are more likely to enclose candidates within a combined list.

At the candidate level, we control for a large set of potential personal vote earning attributes (Shugart et al. 2005). One group of variables is introduced to account for the *political expertise* of a candidate. One of the strongest factors found in virtually all studies on preference voting is incumbency (Carson et al. 2007; Cox & Katz 1996; Gelman & King 1990; Maddens & Put 2013; Put & Maddens 2015), since incumbents dispose of traceable political experience and emanate familiarity. Furthermore and for a similar reason, we include a binary variable capturing whether the candidate is also running for the prestigious second chamber of the Council of States. However, political experience can also be gained at the local level. The typical career of a (Swiss) politician begins at the local and ends at the national level. Even if this *Ochsentour* (drudgery), as it is called in Switzerland, is no longer as widespread as it was in the 20th century, holding a political office at the local level can be a sign of political expertise. Additionally, a local office implies local roots that could attract voters looking for candidates who promise representing the constituency (Tavits 2010). Therefore, we control for whether a candidate holds a political office at the local or cantonal level. Furthermore, *local ties* may be connected to constituency-orientation and thus bear higher incentives for voters to consider a local candidate (Blais et al. 2003; Tavits 2010), which is why we also consider whether a candidate is running for office in the same canton where his hometown is located. Last but not least, a candidate's *personal characteristics* may influence its voting potential, since voters might strive for enhancing descriptive representation (Mansbridge 1999; Bühlmann and Schädel

2012). Therefore, we include controls for gender, age and profession (farmers, workers, and academics).<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, we control for additional factors located at the candidate level: Several studies highlight the importance of ballot position (for an overview see Spierings & Jacobs 2014). The position on the party list has proven to be an important determinant of electoral success, in Switzerland as well as elsewhere (e.g., Lutz 2010; Tavits 2010). Since campaigning is strategic, i.e. *dependent on* the expected chances of electoral success, we need to identify factors that directly affect the endogenous regressor (campaigning) without directly affecting the dependent variable, in order to preclude the problem of omitted variable bias (Moon 2006). One such factor is whether a candidate occupies a waiting-list position. Here, we expect candidates that hold the position on the list that would signify a gain in seat for a party to have particularly strong incentives to invest in his campaign since his chances to succeed are real but not certain. As an example, consider the Swiss Populist Party in the canton of Zurich who held 11 seats during the 2011/15 legislature. Since in most of the cantons, the order of the candidates is determined by their political experience and incumbency status, the candidate on the 12<sup>th</sup> position of the list has a higher incentive to gather personal votes than the candidates placed before and after him.

## Results

We first present our models of the panachage potential, i.e. determinants of preferential votes received from outside a candidate's own party list. Turning to our control variables (Model 1, Table 2), results are as expected: candidates belonging to larger parties also exhibit a higher panachage potential than candidates from more marginalized parties or lists. Furthermore, closeness pays out: candidates are substantially more likely to be added to other lists of the same party or, to some degree, also to connected lists. We also find the assumed effect of the ballot position: the further up a candidate is placed in the list, the more votes she received from panachage. Furthermore, political expertise is highly valued by voters. Incumbent MPs are far more likely to receive panachage votes than their challengers. Also holding a political office on the municipality or the cantonal level bears a comparative advantage and so does running simultaneously for the more prestigious second chamber, the Council of States. Interestingly, women and younger candidates have a significantly higher panachage potential than their peers, presenting a first hint that the panachage vote also serves to enhance descriptive representation.

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<sup>6</sup> In the so called „militia system“ in Switzerland representatives are not professional politicians but they pursue a profession beside their political mandate. Thus, most of the candidates (and even incumbents) mention their occupation. Of course, nobody controls if the candidates really practise the mentioned job or to what level. There are even mentioned such things as “politician” or “artist of live”. However, we argue that the mention of an occupation is an important selling argument for a candidate.

Likewise, farmers are far more likely to be added to existing lists, while the contrary applies to workers, although this relationship is weaker and only marginally significant. Moreover, candidates running in cantons with a higher number of seats display a lower panachage potential, leaving us with the assumption that the higher the number of candidates to be elected, the better the list of candidates already reflects the voters' will and the less panachage is necessary. Last but not least, candidates also receive significantly more panachage votes from lists with empty lines. Apparently, voters tend to maximize their voting potential by adding additional candidates to empty spots on the list.

**Table 2: Determinants of panachage success**

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Intercept	-5.449 (0.224)**	-5.346 (0.23)**	-5.346 (0.229)**
<b>Canton</b>	No. of mandates	-0.051 (0.009)**	-0.048 (0.008)**	-0.047 (0.008)**
	Additional mandate		0.191 (0.187)	0.186 (0.186)
	Mandate Reduction		-0.039 (0.149)	-0.031 (0.148)
	No. of lists	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.012)
<b>Party</b>	Recipient: Vote share 2011	0.007 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
	Donor: Vote share 2011	-0.030 (0.005)**	-0.030 (0.005)**	-0.030 (0.005)**
	Same party	1.213 (0.184)**	1.198 (0.183)**	1.197 (0.183)**
<b>List</b>	Recipient: main	0.478 (0.041)**	0.410 (0.041)**	0.402 (0.041)**
	Recipient: junior	-0.077 (0.044) <sup>°</sup>	-0.057 (0.043)	-0.049 (0.043)
	Recipient: position	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
	Recipient: No. of mandates 2011	0.088 (0.010)**	0.077 (0.010)**	0.076 (0.010)**
	Donor: main	-0.591 (0.025)**	-0.592 (0.025)**	-0.592 (0.025)**
	Donor: junior	0.146 (0.025)**	0.146 (0.025)**	0.146 (0.025)**
	Donor: No. of mandates 2011	-0.086 (0.008)**	-0.086 (0.008)**	-0.086 (0.008)**
	Donor: No. of empty lines on ballot	0.049 (0.002)**	0.049 (0.002)**	0.049 (0.002)**
	Combined lists	0.237 (0.029)**	0.237 (0.029)**	0.236 (0.029)**
<b>Candidate</b>	Ballot position	-0.018 (0.001)**	-0.018 (0.001)**	-0.018 (0.001)**
	Waiting-list position		-0.179 (0.078)*	-0.170 (0.078)*
	Incumbent	1.408 (0.042)**	1.240 (0.046)**	1.435 (0.054)**
	Age	-0.002 (0.001)*	-0.002 (0.001)**	-0.002 (0.001)**
	Woman	0.106 (0.017)**	0.108 (0.017)**	0.109 (0.017)**
	Runs for Council of States	0.653 (0.054)**	0.521 (0.054)**	0.537 (0.054)**
	Holds political office on municipality level	0.157 (0.031)**	0.157 (0.030)**	0.157 (0.030)**
	Holds political office on cantonal level	0.340 (0.035)**	0.299 (0.035)**	0.278 (0.035)**
	Locally anchored	0.084 (0.017)**	0.079 (0.016)**	0.077 (0.016)**
	Academic	0.026 (0.019)	0.030 (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)
	Farmer	0.313 (0.043)**	0.346 (0.042)**	0.349 (0.042)**
	Worker	-0.072 (0.037) <sup>°</sup>	-0.070 (0.036) <sup>°</sup>	-0.068 (0.036) <sup>°</sup>
<b>Campaign</b>	No. of advertisements		0.012 (0.002)**	0.023 (0.002)**
	Share of advertisements on front page		0.155 (0.062)*	0.146 (0.061)*
	Share of individual advertisements		0.158 (0.052)**	0.141 (0.052)**
	Share of advertisements in colour		0.156 (0.035)**	0.119 (0.036)**
	Share of externally funded advertisements		-0.022 (0.043)	-0.040 (0.043)
	Share of testimonial advertisements		0.150 (0.089) <sup>°</sup>	0.123 (0.089)
	Share of event advertisements		0.262 (0.107)*	0.231 (0.107)*
	Negative campaigning		-0.117 (0.089)	-0.113 (0.088)
<b>Interactions</b>	(Incumbent)x(No. of advertisements)			-0.021 (0.003)**
<b>Random effect SDs</b>	Cantonal-Level	0.236	0.216	0.215
	Party-Level	0.636	0.636	0.635
	List-Level	0.658	0.656	0.656
	Candidate-Level	0.454	0.443	0.441
	Residual	0.608	0.608	0.608

Notes: REML-estimates from the regression of log panachage success on different measures. N<sub>observations</sub> = 94174,

N<sub>Candidates</sub> = 3788, N<sub>List-combinations</sub> = 9314, N<sub>Party-combinations</sub> = 336, N<sub>Cantons</sub> = 20; \*\* 99%; \* 95%; <sup>°</sup> 90%.


Turning to our campaign variables (Model 2, Table 2), we find that the more often a candidate was presented on advertisements, the higher his panachage potential.<sup>7</sup> Also the additional campaign variables introduced to capture the visibility of a candidate's campaign (share of coloured ads and the share of ads presented on the frontpage of a newspaper) prove to be significant. Furthermore, an individualized style of campaigning apparently makes a candidate more attractive for voters who chose another party list than the candidate's: the share of externally funded campaign ads is significantly and positively related to the panachage potential. The share of campaign ads displaying a candidate's name together with the invitation to a campaign event generates additional voter potential, too. However, displaying local rootedness by letting speak testimonials (i.e. usually potential voters) in one's campaign is supposed to be only marginally significant. Furthermore, victims of negative campaigning do not necessarily have to fear negative effects: although the postulated relation to the panachage potential is negative, it is not significant.

In model 3 of Table 2, we interacted the incumbency status with the number of campaign ads in order to explore whether electoral campaigning pays out differently for challengers and incumbents. As Figure 1 shows, this is indeed the case. While incumbents do barely seem to profit from (extensive) electoral campaigning, challengers can. In this sense, our results concur with evidence from the U.S. (e.g., Abramowitz 1991; Jacobson 1978; Moon 2006) while they stand in contrast to findings from Belgium (Maddens and Put 2013). As discussed above, Maddens and Put (2013: 853) trace their non-finding back to the size of the constituency: in large constituencies, it might be more difficult to recall all incumbent MPs, while it is easier in smaller constituencies or in majoritarian electoral systems with single-member districts such as the U.S. The average Swiss constituency is, with 7.7 seats per unit, almost half as big as the average Belgium constituency (13.6). By interacting the challenger's campaign effect with district size, future research might shed more light on this matter.

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<sup>7</sup> Of course, our models run the risk of overestimating the campaign effect since irrelevant challengers are included as well (see e.g., Maddens & Put 2013: 853). Yet we also ran models where we only included candidates who were on display of at least one campaign ad ( $N_{\text{candidates}}=1001$ ), assuming that only potentially relevant challengers invested in campaign spending. However, results did not change substantially (results available on request).

**Figure 1: Effect of campaign intensity on electoral success (panachage exploitation)**



*Notes:* This figure is based on the interaction effect included in Model 3, displayed in Table 2. Campaign intensity is captured by a candidate's total number of campaign ads.

In the second set of models we explore the cumulation potential of a candidate, i.e. the votes he or she gets from his own party list (Table 3). Here, we are foremost interested in the differences between intra- and inter-list success. Compared to the panachage models (Table 2) it strikes that women and young candidates are not more likely (although also not less likely) to be cumulated than their peers. Thus, our results present a first hint that voters might strive for descriptive representation via panachage: seemingly, there are many voters who complete their lists with women and young candidates aiming at improving their (under-)representation in the national parliament. On the other hand, farmers are – again – not only more likely to receive additional votes, workers are also significantly less likely to be selected. Furthermore, being an academic seems to increase the electoral success in terms of votes received from cumulation. All in all, a candidate's profession or level of education thus seems to matter somewhat more for intra-list competition.

**Table 3: Determinants of cumulation success**

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Intercept	-2.888 (0.306)**	-2.636 (0.308)**	-2.635 (0.307)**
<b>Canton</b>	No. of mandates	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.023 (0.012) <sup>o</sup>	-0.023 (0.012) <sup>o</sup>
	Additional mandate		0.478 (0.269) <sup>o</sup>	0.475 (0.268) <sup>o</sup>
	Mandate Reduction		-0.1 (0.213)	-0.096 (0.212)
	No. of lists	-0.005 (0.006)	0.029 (0.017)	0.029 (0.017)
<b>Party</b>	Vote share 2011	0.208 (0.052)**	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
<b>List</b>	Main	0.157 (0.051)**	0.168 (0.053)**	0.164 (0.053)**
	Junior	0.010 (0.003)**	0.158 (0.051)**	0.162 (0.051)**
	Position	0.045 (0.004)**	0.01 (0.003)**	0.010 (0.003)**
	No. of empty lines on ballot	0.053 (0.016)**	0.044 (0.004)**	0.044 (0.004)**
	No. of mandates 2011	-0.010 (0.001)**	0.05 (0.016)**	0.050 (0.016)**
<b>Candidate</b>	Ballot position	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.001)**	-0.010 (0.001)**
	Waiting-list position		-0.138 (0.044)**	-0.135 (0.044)**
	Incumbent	0.614 (0.024)**	0.530 (0.026)**	0.591 (0.031)**
	Age	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
	Woman	0.011 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)
	Runs for Council of States	0.297 (0.031)**	0.228 (0.031)**	0.231 (0.031)**
	Holds political office on municipality level	0.074 (0.018)**	0.075 (0.017)**	0.076 (0.017)**
	Holds political office on cantonal level	0.179 (0.021)**	0.161 (0.021)**	0.155 (0.021)**
	Locally anchored	0.031 (0.010)**	0.030 (0.009)**	0.029 (0.009)**
	Academic	0.022 (0.011) <sup>o</sup>	0.024 (0.011)*	0.023 (0.011)*
	Farmer	0.068 (0.024)**	0.088 (0.024)**	0.089 (0.024)**
	Worker	-0.062 (0.021)**	-0.060 (0.021)**	-0.060 (0.021)**
<b>Campaign</b>	No. of advertisements		0.005 (0.001)**	0.009 (0.002)**
	Share of advertisements on front page		0.093 (0.042)*	0.089 (0.042)*
	Share of individual advertisements		0.117 (0.033)**	0.109 (0.033)**
	Share of advertisements in colour		0.003 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.025)
	Share of externally funded advertisements		0.065 (0.026)*	0.057 (0.026)*
	Share of testimonial advertisements		0.120 (0.064) <sup>o</sup>	0.101 (0.064)
	Share of event advertisements		0.144 (0.066)*	0.134 (0.066)**
	Negative campaigning		0.042 (0.055)	0.046 (0.055)
<b>Interactions</b>	(Incumbent)x(No. of advertisements)			-0.007 (0.002)**
<b>Random effect SDs</b>	Cantonal-Level	0.348	0.315	0.312
	Party-Level	0.181	0.189	0.190
	List-Level	0.269	0.269	0.270
	Residual	0.260	0.256	0.255

Notes: REML-estimates from the regression of log cumulation success on different measures. NCandidates = 3788, NLists = 422, NParties = 20, NCantons = 20; \*\* 99%; \* 95%; <sup>o</sup> 90%.

In terms of campaign advertisements, we cannot detect strong differences between the two sets of models, although in general, the campaign effects appear to be slightly less certain. Yet particularly displaying local ties by inviting voters to pre-election parties or by including testimonials to promote one's vote seems to exert less an effect on loyal voters than on voters who choose another party list than the candidate they added to the list. The same holds true for one aspect of the visibility of a candidate's campaign: the impact of coloured advertisements is less important for cumulation than for panachage. Finally, even if the impact is not significant, a look at the findings for the negative advertisements is noticeable because of the reversal of the sign. While negative campaigning tends to negatively influence panachage success, it rather is rewarding for intra-party choice. We tentatively assume that it is the most extreme candidates of a given list that are negatively portrayed by other parties. It is these candidates however, that most attracts the own voters. Of course, the results are not significant and there is only very few

negative campaigning in Switzerland. However, given the stability of all other results the change of sign is worth noting.

We may only speculate about the reasons for these – all in all – quite small differences. One might be that, given the – on average – rather small district size of Swiss cantons, voters already know the candidates of their preferred party list while candidates from other lists still have the possibility to attract an alien voters' interest by making themselves known via (local) electoral campaigning. However and against our expectations, individualized campaigning also enhances the cumulation potential. A possible reason for this finding might be the way we operationalized our variable. Campaign advertisements sponsored by associations might not necessarily undermine the intra-list popularity of a candidate, particularly not if the association stands ideologically close to the party list chosen. Here, a more fine-grained operationalization of individualized campaigning might have led to different results.

## Discussion

This paper follows the tradition of analysis of electoral performance in answering the fundamental question of who gets elected. The open list-system in Switzerland allows for both, gathering additional votes from inside a candidate's own list (intra-list-votes; so called cumulation), as well as additional votes from outside his own list (inter-list-votes; so called panachage). If we consider *choosing a list* as the ideological act of voting, the analysis of the additional votes (due to cumulation and/or panachage) allows us to examine the voting preferences controlling for ideological affiliation. In this sense, we ask which factors besides ideology voters explicitly or implicitly consider to be important when selecting their candidates. More specifically, we are interested in the effects of electoral campaigning on the voter potential and adopt an exploratory approach to detect potential differences between campaign effects for cumulative and panachage votes.

Besides the potential to enrich the discussion on the conditions of electoral success in open-list proportional systems, the comparison has a methodological advantage. Other than previous studies, we fully exploit the data's potential by modelling the votes of an individual candidate *in relation to the alternatives* a voter was offered on the same as well as on other party lists.

The combination of our unique dataset consisting of campaign advertisements published in more than 50 important national and regional newspapers (Bühlmann et al. 2015) with the official statistics of panachage and cumulation (BFS 2016) show that campaigning indeed is an important factor for increasing the probability of getting a panachage or a cumulation vote. Not only the number of advertisements but also their content, i.e. whether they show the candidate



alone or promote an event to get to know the candidate, significantly increase both kinds of additional votes. These factors therefore help a candidate stand out against her party colleagues as well as against candidates from other lists.

These results are in accordance with previous studies which have shown that stronger campaigning activities increase the familiarity with the candidates (Biersack et al. 1993, Bonneau 2007, Jacobson 1990). This also explains the higher benefit of campaign spending for challengers compared to incumbents: the former are less well known and can thus introduce themselves via campaigning. Campaigning thus allows voters to look beyond what they already know, i.e. to consider alien lists and less familiar candidates.

To some extent, however, our results also challenge hitherto findings or our own expectations. We highlight three points:

- (1) While the result concerning the different impact of campaigning for incumbents and challengers concur with findings from the US elections, they deviate from findings from Belgium (Maddens et al. 2006) or Brazil (Samuels 2001). The differences between Belgium / Brazil and the US cannot fully be explained by the voting system, given that Belgium and Brazil as well as Switzerland are characterized as open-list PR systems. Since the country studies differ in several terms, such as district size or operationalization of our campaign variable, we refrain from attempts to explain these differences at this point. Nevertheless, these results claim for further investigation, at the national as well as at the international level.
- (2) We did not detect large differences of campaign influence when comparing votes received from panachage (inter-list competition) to the ones received from cumulation (intra-list competition). Yet again, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions. Alternative measures of the content of a campaign, for example as regards the degree of individualized campaigning, might have led to different results. Furthermore, district size might make a difference: while with increasing district size, it becomes more difficult to remember all candidates from a chosen list, it might become even more difficult to remember “alien” candidates (which makes it comparatively easier for the latter to make themselves known via campaigning).
- (3) Yet the importance of having the choice to add candidates from the selected as well as candidates from alien lists was demonstrated for other non-campaign related factors. Most interesting, young or female candidates get significantly more panachage votes than older or male candidates, while there are no such differences concerning cumulation votes. Many voters thus actively search for young or female candidates on alien lists to complete the list of their first (ideological) choice. We assume that this can be attributed to the

underrepresentation of such candidates on most main lists. This finding shows one advantage of the fully open list system in Switzerland. When voters are allowed to choose among candidates not only from their selected list but among any candidate from any list, they benefit from the advantages of both, the candidate centred majoritarian as well as the ideology centred proportional system. Such a system seemingly allows for both, descriptive as well as ideological representation.

Our contribution suggests several avenues for improvement. First, while we included a fair amount of important factors, there still are some aspects that are not yet considered in our models. These are additional ideological factors: it would be interesting to control for the ideological distance between the recipient and donor lists (although we already slightly approach this by controlling for list apparentments) as well as for the main issues of an election campaign. This would offer a possibility to compare the impact of ideological as well as non-ideological factors on personal votes received. Second, it would be worthwhile to explore the hypothesized influence of district size on the impact of electoral campaigns, as for example by comparing the campaign effects for the elections to the First and the Second Chamber – or interacting campaign effects with district size. Third, we captured electoral campaigning via advertisements placed in national and regional newspapers. Although in Switzerland, newspapers offer still an important, if not the most important, arena for electoral campaigning, other channels of campaigning gain in importance. Most notably, social media (see e.g., Spierings & Jacobs 2014) offers the opportunity for engaging in a new type of campaigning that may not only be characterized by lower costs but as well by a higher intensity of political advertising.

Thus, more research is needed to investigate the interplay between ideology, candidate factors and campaign strategies for vote choice and electoral success. Nevertheless, our paper shows that having the opportunity, many voters pick their cherries not only from one but from different trees.

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